SMRs: A Critical Piece of Washington’s Energy Future

By: Nicholas Lipperd

The state of Washington has been an effective leader in the transition to clean energy production and must continue to lead boldly. In passing the Clean Energy Transformation Act, Washington pledged to become a carbon-free energy producer by 2045. While the State’s natural resources allow hydroelectric power to lead the charge, hydroelectric cannot achieve Washington’s goal alone. With electricity demands expected to grow between 30% and 90% by 2045, in addition to the statewide drought that has been hampering hydroelectric power over the last decade, other clean energy sectors must step up. Solar is the industry that garners the most attention, and wind certainly has a role to play, but neither can contribute a reliable and sufficient portion of electricity demands for the immediate future. In order for the State  to meet its energy goals while maintaining its status as an energy exporter rather than importer, Washington should expand its commitment to nuclear energy. 

In the simplest of terms, a nuclear plant is nothing more than a hot rock that makes steam. That steam turns enormous turbines that, in turn, create clean, carbon-free electricity. Washington’s only nuclear power plant, Columbia Generating Station, generates 1200 megawatts (“MW”), enough to independently power the city of Seattle. By comparison, a single wind turbine typically creates 2.75 MW and the solar panels on a home generate about 300 watts (0.0003 MW). Given technological advancements, well-designed safety systems, and carefully monitored training standards, nuclear reactor plants in the U.S. are exceptionally safe steam-producing rocks. Just as importantly, the nuclear industry — as a whole — is an exceptionally safe operating environment, with only 0.1 fatalities per trillion kilowatt-hours of production in the U.S., as compared to 10,000 fatalities in U.S. coal production (and 100,000 in global coal).

Despite the incredible power reactors safely produce, America’s nuclear industry has been slowly declining because of diminishing economic value. Why make an investment in an industry with so many permitting and safety requirements when coal or gas can be produced so cheaply? This short-sighted approach is one from which America is finally shifting. The recently passed Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill (“BIB”) and Inflation Reduction Act (“IRA”) have created opportunities and incentives for the nuclear industry that the state of Washington must seize so that it may continue to meet its energy goals and lead our country towards clean, sustainable energy production. The BIB and IRA allow states to resurrect the dying nuclear industry and capitalize on an energy source that is powerful, long-lasting, and carbon-free. The IRA, for example, invests $2 billion into energy research, functionally accelerating the permitting and production of Small Module Reactors (“SMRs”). The IRA also allocates a $25 per MW credit for any new carbon-free energy production and invests $700 million in uranium enrichment for production of more efficient reactors. The BIB allocates funding directed to the continued operation of existing reactors; $6 billion in credits incentivizes companies and states to extend the lifetime of their reactors. Nuclear power currently provides 52% of the nation’s 100% clean electricity, and these bills embrace the idea that nuclear energy is vital to achieve carbon-free energy independence.

Washington must capitalize on these bills and further integrate nuclear power into its plan for clean energy production. Nuclear energy currently accounts for just under 10% of Washington’s power production, while hydroelectric dominates at 66%. Hydroelectric will continue to dominate, but it is unable to meet consumer demand alone. Washington’s two largest hydroelectric plants are over 80 years old. Its largest, Grand Coulee, has produced 20% less energy in recent years due to drought. As climate change makes droughts more likely and thus hydroelectric less reliable, nuclear energy can operate as a counterbalance. During dry seasons, Columbia Generating Station operates at near 100% output continuously to make up for demand. When spring comes and hydroelectric surges, Columbia is able to reduce its output, allowing demand to be met while extending the plant’s lifetime. Nuclear energy is dependent on, to paraphrase the USPS, neither wind nor rain nor heat nor sun. 

Columbia Generating Station is licensed to operate through 2043. The station seems to already be taking advantage of BIB funding: it has plans to increase power output 15% by 2033 and will likely extend the lifetime of the reactor through 2063. That is a critical step in the right direction, but, simply put, it won’t be enough. Washington needs more reactors and more flexibility in their operation to support its hydroelectric generation and meet increasing demands. Should Washington enable new reactor plant construction to meet demands, and SMRs are the best bet.

SMRs, defined by the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) as modular nuclear power plants of 300 MW or less, are the next generation of nuclear reactors. A module design allows SMRs to be almost built completely in a controlled factory setting and installed module by module, reducing construction and maintenance costs and offline time. The small size means less heat energy to manage, less radioactivity during operations, and less radioactive waste. It also means the design is safer than current operating plants despite needing fewer safety systems. Due to their size and design, SMRs are so safe that they can’t melt down, the sensationalized concern of traditional nuclear plants. The small size also allows plants to be strategically placed in regions where power production or supply has traditionally been a challenge.

NuScale’s 77 MW is the leading SMR design for DOE approval. NuScale’s design includes installment plans of four or twelve reactors, depending on the energy demand for the region in which it would be installed. The small size and modularity allow flexibility of site location, expanding options to low water flow regions. This flexibility allows SMRs like NuScale to be built throughout Washington such that they are placed to efficiently bring energy to traditionally hard to supply regions while staying protected from natural disasters. SMRs can adjust power levels much more quickly and efficiently than large plants such as Columbia. Thus, placing SMRs near existing hydroelectric plants will allow nuclear power to more efficiently complement the hydroelectric plant’s output based on water flow. 

Even before the IRA made SMRs increasingly economically viable, Washington’s Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council (“EFSEC”) was scouting potential sites for SMRs. Because the DOE permitting process is cumbersome, sites with either existing energy operations or prior energy permits would enable the quickest installations. EFSEC has identified six of the former and nine of the latter with adequate conditions for SMR installation. With the IRA providing a pathway for cheaper, more efficient uranium and credits for clean energy production, Washington should take advantage and commit SMRs to some of these sites. 

Decades of design improvements prevent the world from experiencing another Chernobyl. Tightly regulated training standards and supervision prevents America from seeing another Three-Mile Island. Careful site selection and the design of SMRs are the nail in the coffin of nuclear disaster fears. In fact, the SMR idea has been flawlessly executed in Washington already. The U.S. Navy has operated SMR-style reactors incident-free in the most dynamic of environments for seventy-five years, with as many as a dozen such reactors operating on ships stationed in the Puget Sound. 
Nuclear power is energy that can be created without any carbon emissions that’s production does not rely on weather patterns. It is safe and reliable, but just as importantly, it produces magnitudes more power than other forms of energy. Not only has nuclear power earned a spot in Washington’s energy future, it is an energy source that Washington must embrace in order to meet its energy goals.

Identity Theft in the New Information Age

By: HR Fitzmorris

The Supreme Court recently granted the petition for a writ of certiorari in Dubin v. United States, agreeing to review the Fifth Circuit’s decision to uphold the conviction of Dubin for aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1).

Though seemingly mundane when compared with the Court’s recent blockbuster docket, this case raises interesting questions about what it means to commit identity theft in today’s technological landscape, and how prosecutors are adapting antiquated statutes to a new technological reality.

David Durbin was charged with health care fraud after he improperly billed Medicaid for patient care provided at the youth health facility where he worked. He had inflated the price of service and falsified the date to fit within the one-year limit for reimbursement.  Even though the fraud only netted the shelter $92, federal prosecutors tacked on an aggravated identity theft charge which carries a mandatory 24-month prison sentence. The aggravated identity theft statute makes it a federal crime, “during and in relation to a” predicate felony, to knowingly transfer, possess, or “use[], without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Prosecutors reasoned that because Durbin used the patient’s name on the fraudulent form—even though Durbin was not impersonating the patient nor making misrepresentations about his identity—he had violated § 1028A(a)(1).

The district court convicted Durbin, despite the seemingly draconian punishment.  On announcing the verdict, the district court judge stated that he “hope[d]” that the conviction would “get reversed.” However, the en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed

Prior to 1998, identity theft crimes were charged under “false personation” statutes, which go back to the late 19th century. False personation is “the crime of falsely assuming the identity of another to gain a benefit or avoid an expense.” Concern over the increasing ease of obtaining others’ identifying information for nefarious purposes skyrocketed as thieves went digital. Congress passed the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act in 1998, during the fledgling years of the world wide web. In his statement on signing the bill, President Clinton noted that “[a]s we enter the Information Age, it is critical that our newest technologies support our oldest values.” In 2004, Congress added the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement, which established penalties for “aggravated” identity theft. Aggravated identity theft was defined as using the identity of another person to commit felony crimes, including immigration violations, theft of another’s Social Security benefits, and acts of domestic terrorism. 

Cases such as Durbin’s are raising questions about the potential reach of these statutes. Broad statutory language offers flexibility in a sector that is known for its quick innovations and ever-changing nature, which can be advantageous to prosecutors looking to curb cybercrime.  But, as the dissenting Fifth Circuit judges noted, the majority’s reading necessarily implicates “not only [] most every commission of healthcare fraud, but would also sweep in tax preparers, immigration attorneys, and anyone else convicted of submitting any form on someone’s behalf that contains a misrepresentation unrelated to the person’s identity.” This creates the risk of criminal liability for those submitting prepared forms on behalf of clients that contain misrepresentations that may have come from the client directly or from a mistake.

Chief Judge Priscilla Owen supported the majority reading of the statute, stating that the statute does not say anything about identity theft, but rather imposes an enhancement for certain felonies on anyone who “knowingly … uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.”

How the Supreme Court answers the question of “whether simply reciting another person’s name in the course of committing Medicaid fraud constitutes aggravated identity theft, or whether that person’s name has to play a ‘key role in the fraudulent activity’” may affect how identity theft is prosecuted in the future.

“Mob” Mentality: The Push for Unionization of Anime Voice Actors

By: Nicholas Neathamer

Whether you’re just hearing about it or are already a raving fan, the popularity of anime continues to skyrocket. Anime is a style of Japanese film and television animation that has garnered worldwide fans for decades, but the emergence of streaming platforms and their willingness to embrace the medium has given rise to booming demand for anime content in recent years. The market size of the anime industry has steadily risen over time and is expected to generate revenue of over $47 billion by 2028. Despite the overwhelming success of the industry, one often overlooked factor of an anime’s popularity is its cast of voice actors, who bring animated characters to life through dialogue. Existing in further obscurity are the voice actors who “dub” shows and movies, providing voiceover work in various languages to attract viewers around the world. These ‘dubbing’ voice actors often provide services for streaming platforms such as Netflix, Hulu, and anime-exclusive platform Crunchyroll. One of Crunchyroll’s most popular shows is currently Mob Psycho 100, and the platform recently began airing the anime’s third and final season. 

Despite Mob Psycho 100’s popularity, one of the most incendiary issues in the anime world recently has been Crunchyroll’s recasting of the show’s English voice for the protagonist. Kyle McCarley, the original English dubbing voice actor for the titular Shigeo “Mob” Kageyama, was informed by Crunchyroll that he would not be returning as the English voice of Mob. According to McCarley, the fallout was due to the actor’s request that after this final season of Mob Psycho 100, Crunchyroll would meet with union representatives to negotiate a potential contract for future productions. McCarley is part of the Screen Actors Guild – American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA), an American labor union representing actors, voiceover artists, journalists, singers, radio personalities, and other media professionals. Crunchyroll currently chooses to not work with any SAG-AFTRA contracts, and McCarley’s proposal for a future union contract was allegedly enough for the streaming platform to look for a new lead voice for Mob Psycho 100. 

It’s no mystery as to why a company like Crunchyroll wouldn’t want to work with unionized voice actors. Unions like SAG-AFTRA are often able to secure more favorable terms for union members through the use of collective bargaining and standard contracts, such as SAG-AFTRA’s Dubbing Agreement. Entering into union contracts would bind Crunchyroll to pay voice actors at scheduled minimum payment rates, contribute to pension and health plans, and follow additional rules set forth by the union. Unionized labor forces are also able to more effectively go on strike against employers to push for higher compensation or new terms to their contracts. In particular, SAG-AFTRA voice actors went on strike against large video game publishers in 2016, arguing for residuals, transparency in roles, higher safety precautions, and better safety assurances for actors while on set. Rather than submit itself to such terms and the increased possibility of a strike, Crunchyroll has eschewed even the possibility of utilizing SAG-AFTRA talent. Instead, Crunchyroll hired non-union Ernesto Jason Liebrecht to voice the character of Mob.  

Some fans of Mob Psycho 100 have wondered whether McCarley can seek legal recourse after the recasting, including whether McCarley may have copyright protections over his portrayal of Mob. However, this is almost certainly not the case. In Garcia v. Google, Inc., a case from 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined whether an individual actor or actress may claim copyright in his or her performance in a motion picture. The court looked to the Copyright Act, which states that “[c]opyright protection subsists…in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression…[including] motion pictures.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The Act also states that such a fixation must be done “by or under the authority of the author.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. The court ultimately agreed with the Copyright Office, who explained that its “longstanding practices do not allow a copyright claim by an individual actor or actress in his or her performance contained within a motion picture” and that for copyright registration purposes, “a motion picture is a single integrated work” and an acting performance cannot be registered apart from the motion picture. Therefore, McCarley, also solely an actor, would not be able to claim copyright over his role.

Another question posed is whether Liebrecht’s portrayal of Mob violates McCarley’s rights under California’s statutory scheme or common law (as the company operates primarily out of that state), including whether Liebrecht is able to imitate McCarley’s voice for Mob. California Civil Code section 3344 provides that anyone who knowingly and without prior consent uses another’s voice or likeness in any manner, on or in products or goods, shall be liable for any damages sustained by those injured. However, this statute only explicitly covers the actual voice and not vocal sound-alikes. Meanwhile, under California’s common law, imitating another person’s voice can violate that person’s right of publicity, as seen in the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Midler v. Ford Motor Co. In that case, the court alluded to protections against imitations of a performer’s voice. The court held that “when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs” and have therefore committed a tort under California law. That said, such a narrow holding is unlikely to be applied to a performer such as McCarley, whose voice is not nearly as “widely known.” There also remains the issue that many may claim Liebrecht’s performance, while similar, is not an imitation of McCarley’s portrayal of Mob. 

While McCarley likely has no options to pursue legal recourse against Crunchyroll in this situation, there remains a silver lining for those who wish to see their favorite English dub actors be able to unionize more effectively. In 2019, Netflix reached out to SAG-AFTRA to negotiate a direct union agreement, leading to a 2019 agreement that included a Netflix-specific Dubbing Agreement. And on August 31, 2022, SAG-AFTRA members voted to ratify the successor contract, the 2022 SAG-AFTRA Netflix Agreement. This has further solidified the relationship between the streaming platform and union for dubbing contracts going forward, and has bolstered voice actors who work on dubs to continue a push for unionization. Looking down the road, the goodwill acquired by Netflix and push towards increased unionization may lead to a lack of dubbing talent—and a need to change policies—at Crunchyroll. 


The Fourth Amendment’s Third-Party Exposure Doctrine in the New Age of Data

By: Kyle Kennedy

The Fourth Amendment protects US citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by creating an administrative barrier between citizens and investigating authorities. In addition to the Fourth Amendment, the lack of government resources also serves to protect individual privacy because investigative authorities can neither afford nor validate surveillance of citizens past a certain cost-benefit tradeoff. Together, the intended effect of these protections is to sufficiently guard against invasions of citizen’s privacy by government authorities in pursuit of evidence. However, the interaction of modern-day technology and the increased availability of data as a result of the Third-Party Exposure Doctrine leaves US citizen’s personal information exposed to the government in unprecedented ways.

The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment provides protections to citizens based on a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the Third-Party Exposure Doctrine states that information willingly revealed to third parties is not subject to Fourth Amendment protections. As an example, in U.S. v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for information shared in bank records. However, in the landmark case of Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the Third-Party Exposure Doctrine by holding that collecting seven days worth of cell phone location information was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, it is worth noting that the holding in Carpenter was cabined to its facts, therefore leaving significant questions about the application of the Third-Party Exposure Doctrine to consumer data and electronic records unanswered.  

In addition to the privacy protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, the Stored Communications Act (SCA) protects against searches of electronically stored information. Under the SCA, the government can access content information of emails that have been unopened and in storage for over 180 days or of email that have been opened and undeleted with a mere administrative subpoena or 2703(d) court order. The SCA provides even less protection to non-content data like account information or metadata. The weak protections this statute provides for electronically stored information demonstrates that the statute does not fit the modern state of technology and data privacy and is clearly outdated.

Given the exponential increase in internet use and data creation in recent years, consumer data has never been as plentifully available as it is today. According to Forbes, Americans send 188 million emails, 18.1 million texts, and 4.5 million Google searches every minute. Further, Americans download 390,030 third-party apps every minute, all of which seek consent from the user to collect their data. Under the landmark Carpenter case, the Fourth Amendment protects against the unwarranted collection of seven days of cell phone records. This precedent could ostensibly be extended to consumer data shared on third-party apps. However, the Supreme Court has so far declined to determine whether a shorter period of data collection would be permissible or whether data consensually shared with third-party apps triggers a lower expectation of privacy than automatically collected cell phone records. 

The SCA does not provide any better answers than the current body of case law. Overall, the SCA tends to create a relatively low administrative hurdle for searches of electronic data.  The SCA categorizing of digital records based on content, whether the records are opened, and the time in storage is an ineffective approach to balancing privacy protections against the government’s investigative need. A wide variety of individual data is not cleanly divided by the SCA’s categories of the content or whether it has been opened or deleted.  Furthermore, the efficacy of providing lower protections to older records is reduced by the government’s need for timely investigative data as well as individual’s continued privacy interest in that older data.

The lack of clear Fourth Amendment (or other statutory) protections for electronic data weakens the barrier of privacy between individuals and the government. This barrier is further weakened by the relatively low cost of investigation through the searching of electronic data and records. For example, advanced saliency algorithms and deep learning techniques allow authorities to process visual data and access information at quicker speeds and lower costs than ever before. These same algorithms and techniques are easily applied to non-visual user data generated by third-party applications. Individuals using third-party applications on their personal devices store messages, locational data, and other consumer data on these platforms which potentially exposes this data to the government under the Third-Party Exposure Doctrine.  Although the majority in Carpenter limited the Third-Party Exposure Doctrine as it relates to cell phone data, it remains unclear what level of privacy the Fourth Amendment provides to data shared with third-party applications. Although Carpenter discussed the pervasive nature of cell phones in everyday life, the Court also specifically mentioned that the cell phone data in that case was tracked and recorded without any affirmative action by the user. Data shared through third-party apps often requires the user’s consent to data collection. It could be argued that the user’s consent is a voluntary exposure to a third party, thus leaving room for a distinguishing argument by the government. While the precise nature of the privacy protections provided by the Fourth Amendment to electronic data are unclear, there is a clear tension between the modern state of technological surveillance and the current rule of law protecting US citizens’ individual information. 

The implications of insufficient protection of consumer data are wide-reaching.  For example, there is serious concern that data from third-party apps tracking menstrual cycles or location data could be used in criminal prosecution in states that have recently instituted abortion bans or restrictions. Given the current political climate, the relative powers of the branches of the federal government, and the slow-moving and unpredictable nature of the Supreme Court, the most ideal path forward would be for Congress to pass new nation-wide privacy protection legislation. There are many advantages to a clearcut, nation-wide framework of law which balances the need for privacy with the need for government investigation while providing technologically relevant protection to personal data. A question for future research would be whether Congress’s scope of power would allow it to regulate the use of consumer data by investigative authorities, specifically at the state level. Assuming the power is within their scope, an act of Congress would provide the most effective solution to closing the gap between modern technology and current law. Absent such congressional action, US citizens will be forced to rely upon the legislating bodies of their individual states to provide increased personal data privacy protections.

Why we should pay attention to standard essential patents

By: Han Xue

Standard essential patents, or “SEPs,” are patents that protect technology essential to an industry’s standard use. The name is self-descriptive, in that such patents set the standard that an industry must use in order to innovate effectively. One example of this is WiFi. So long as a router is available, it doesn’t matter what phone or computer one has, because, generally speaking, any phone or computer, regardless of brand, will be able to connect to it. So, the ability to connect to WiFi is an industry-standard, and WiFi itself falls under the umbrella of standard essential patents. Other examples include USBs and JPEG, as well as LTE and 5G technology for phones. These industry-specific standard-setting organizations (SSOs), or standard development organizations (SDOs), composed of industry leaders determine which patents are essential for the entire industry’s success, and thus, qualify to be SEPs. Once recognized, an SEP can then be licensed to entities in the relevant industry.

The ubiquity of SEPs and the roles they play in many of the technologies in common use today make them immensely valuable. The ability to monetize them through licensing can serve as a strong incentive for research and development in many industries, especially those involved in complex technologies that require significant investment to develop, and the mirroring loss of financial compensation that occurs when an SEP is infringed upon gives companies good reason to maintain a tight grip over the ownership of their SEPs. Furthermore, the development and spread of the standards that such patents protect can enable smaller businesses to more easily access the market, creating competitive conditions that drive down prices for consumers and incentivize innovation.

Given the above, it’s unsurprising that a 2021 announcement by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) regarding a draft policy statement on the 2019 Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments drew some attention. The original 2019 policy statement, among other things, examined remedies for infringement of SEPs subject to certain licensing agreements, and the draft, which contained language limiting the use of injunctions in the enforcement of SEPs drew strong scrutiny from those in the intellectual property (IP) field.

One negative reaction to the anti-injunction portion of the draft policy was provided by the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), which published an article decrying the policy as one that would effectively reduce the value of SEPs, discourage innovation, and undermine the reliability of the intellectual property system in the United States. Specifically, the CSIS focused on the concern that, without the threat of injunctions, infringers would face fewer risks by refusing certain fair licensing agreements and gain terms skewed in their favor. This would, among other things, harm SEP owners acting in good faith, ultimately leading to a decrease in SEP value and a subsequent decrease in competition at the standard-setting level. Another article was published by IPWatchdog, which criticized its language and unsupported statements. In the end, after receiving substantial criticism, the draft policy statement revealed in 2021 was not implemented.

More recently, policy related to SEPs has continued to evolve. This last summer, the DOJ, USPTO, and NIST announced a complete withdrawal from the 2019 policy statement, with the stated goal of creating “incentives to generate more innovation.” The three agencies also noted concerns about anti-competitive actions surrounding the implementation of SEPs, and explicitly claimed that this move would “strengthen the ability of U.S. companies to engage and influence international standards that are essential to our nation’s technological leadership.” More specifically, this withdrawal signals the DOJ’s attempt to use a case-by-case approach when analyzing opportunistic behavior that may lead to anticompetitive behavior in the context of certain licenses for SEPs. This move has been met with less disdain than the 2021 draft policy statement. Save Our Standards, a group centered around certain patent licensing commitments, applauded it as a step towards a fair and transparent licensing system for SEPs. Others have adopted more of a wait-and-see approach, watching for further guidance from the DOJ and pending litigation.

Right now, the stakes for the implementation of such policies are higher than ever. In 2021, the United States ranked 3rd on the Global Innovation Index (GII). However, over the last decade or so, and in the last few years, in particular, there has been a growing media focus on the perception of a blanket decrease in American innovation, and a corresponding decrease in American competitiveness in the global context. This has contributed to a flood of publications centered around current policy and America’s decline in innovation, especially in areas related to technological innovation. Given the state of intra- and international competition in technological fields, as well as increasing international tensions over technological supremacy, it is more important than ever to keep a close eye on legal developments that influence innovation, such as policy decisions affecting the protection of SEPs.