Emulation or Piracy for Profit? Nintendo Says No.

By: Kevin Vu

Nintendo, the developer of various beloved video games and consoles, was recently in the news for its lawsuit against, and subsequent settlement with, Tropic Haze, the developers of the Nintendo Switch emulator “Yuzu.” In the initial complaint, Nintendo alleged that “[w]ith Yuzu in hand, nothing stops a user from obtaining and playing unlawful copies of virtually any game made for the Nintendo Switch, all without paying a dime to Nintendo or any of the hundreds of other game developers and publishers making and selling games for the Nintendo Switch. In effect, Yuzu turns general computing devices into tools for massive intellectual property infringement of Nintendo and others’ copyrighted works.” In essence, Nintendo alleged that Tropic Haze “facilitate[d] piracy at a colossal scale.

Nintendo’s battles against piracy are nothing new. The company has a storied history of filing lawsuits against various forms of piracy – including individuals who sold Nintendo Switch-hacking devices and international cases against Nintendo game copy-holding websites. But some commentators argue that emulation is not piracy – which might explain why Nintendo has yet not filed similar lawsuits against other emulators like “Dolphin” (which emulates the Nintendo Wii). 

Emulation or Piracy?

Emulation, as commonly referred to in this context, means a computer program that “imitates a video game console.” At first blush, it is easy to see why such programs would be an issue for first-party developers like Nintendo. Emulation programs might disincentivize consumers from buying the latest video game console to play their video games for example.  The historic answer to criticisms like that is that emulation falls under fair use

For example, in Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 609 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit determined that an emulator for Sony’s PlayStation did not infringe on Sony’s copyright because that emulator fell under fair use. Courts typically consider four factors for determining whether fair use applies: (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Under the Ninth Circuit’s precedence at the time, fair use preserved the public’s access to elements in copyrighted computer codes. Sony Comput. Ent., 203 F.3d at 603. The court determined that the second factor weighed in favor of fair use because Sony’s program was not publicly available such that the defendant’s process of reverse engineering Sony’s program was necessary to replicate the program. Id. at 603-04. As to the first and fourth factors, the court concluded that the defendant’s emulation program was transformative because it “afford[ed] opportunities for game play in new environments” such that “the [emulator was] a legitimate competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and Sony-licensed games [could] be played.” Id. at 606-07. Accordingly, the court concluded that the emulation of Sony’s PlayStation was protected under fair use. Id. at 609.

That reverse engineering approach was codified by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f), which generally allows for reverse engineering of a computer program “for the sole purpose of . . . achiev[ing] interoperability of an independently created program[.]” 

In contrast, piracy is understood as “[t]he illegal reproduction and distribution of copyrighted material on the Web.” That definition is distinguishable from the situation in the Sony Computer Entertainment case because there, the emulator was essentially a reverse engineered PlayStation that did not wholly copy Sony’s program. But, as some proponents have argued, emulation naturally leads to piracy because emulators do not have anti-piracy safeguards. The idea behind this is that a video game console, like the Nintendo Switch, will have safeguards that disallow someone from using a pirated copy of a game, but emulators do not have that same protection. Because emulators can run on pirated games, the argument is that emulators support piracy by doing so, resulting in lost profits for the developers of both games and consoles. In contrast, however, some argue that emulation is necessary to preserve the history of video games, along with letting people enjoy games or video game systems that are no longer produced or supported.

Why Yuzu was Targeted.

Many individuals have theorized that Yuzu was targeted because the program emulated a current-generation console in the Nintendo Switch, as opposed to other emulators which are focused on older consoles that are no longer supported. Others have pointed out that Nintendo’s original complaint did not explicitly argue that the Yuzu emulator was illegal, but rather because Yuzu’s developers showed how to break into Nintendo’s game files or even a Nintendo Switch. Additionally, the complaint also noted that Yuzu had a Patreon page (a website that allows people to support creators by donating on a monthly subscription basis) that provided subscribers with early access and unreleased features to the public – in short, that Tropic Haze was profiting from Yuzu. 

Whatever the reason, Nintendo’s actions have already had wide effects on other emulators. For example, Tropic Haze was also developing “Citra,” a 3DS emulator, but under their settlement agreement with Nintendo, Citra has also been discontinued. Another Nintendo console emulator, “DraStic” (for the Nintendo DS), used to be a paid app on Google Play but has since been free to download

All of this is a signal that Nintendo, and perhaps other companies, may seek to be more litigious with emulators. Although the DMCA and case law may allow certain forms of emulation, clearly Nintendo is looking at other strategies to fight emulators. For example, when the Dolphin emulator was seeking to be added to the Steam storefront, Nintendo told Steam that Dolphin did not comply with the DMCA because Dolphin used Nintendo’s encryption keys. Dolphin disputed that determination, but Steam refused to allow Dolphin on its storefront until Dolphin and Nintendo could reach an agreement. Currently, Dolphin is still available on the Internet for download and use. Whatever the case, individuals and emulators should be wary about Nintendo’s – and other video game company’s – recent efforts in combating emulation and privacy.

Virtual Shareholders’ Meetings: Yay or Nay?

Picture1By Alex Bullock

Next month, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. will hold their annual shareholders’ meeting in Omaha, Nebraska. Berkshire Hathaway’s annual shareholders’ meeting is a spectacle unlike any other, bringing investors from around the country (if not the world) to middle America for a weekend of free swag and corporate governance. Along with a 5k run, a movie screening, and endless corporate partner booths, the shareholders will take formal corporate action to vote to elect directors, to give an advisory vote on executive compensation plans, and to act on shareholder proposals, among other things. Berkshire Hathaway’s annual shareholders’ meeting is a significant event; indeed, I myself have thought about buying stock in the company just to see what their shareholder meeting is like in person. Continue reading

Are My Emails Beyond the Grasp of the U.S. Government?

gavelBy Mackenzie Olson

Companies like Microsoft and Google store a lot of customer data in storage centers overseas. As of July 2016, 2nd Circuit precedent indicated that, due to the foreign location of those centers, the U.S. government could not compel these companies to turn over data, even by issue of a search warrant. The case that rendered this decisions was In the Matter of Warrant to Search a Certain E–Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft Corporation. (But also take note of the dissent in the denial of en banc review). As the Southern District of New York adjudicated the Warrant case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was its final arbiter. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment only controlled as precedent in that jurisdiction. And though its opinion has been persuasive elsewhere, at least one judge, based in the Third Circuit, now disagrees with its outcome.

On February 3, 2017, Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an opinion and subsequent orders compelling Google to turn over certain data stored in overseas facilities, per the request of two previously issued search warrants.

In his opinion, Judge Rueter explains that, “the present dispute centers on the nature and reach of the warrants issued pursuant to section 2703 of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 (“SCA”).

He frames the relevant issues as follows: “The court must determine whether the [g]overnment may compel Google to produce electronic records relating to user accounts pursuant to search warrants issued under section 2703 of the SCA, or in the alternative, whether Google has provided all records in its possession that the [g]overnment may lawfully compel Google to produce in accordance with the Second Circuit’s ruling.” Rueter ultimately holds that “compelling Google to disclose to the [g]overnment the data that is the subject of the warrants does not constitute an unlawful extraterritorial application of the [SCA].”

In its reporting of the decision, news outlet Reuters particularly emphasizes Judge Rueter’s reasoning that “transferring emails from a foreign server so FBI agents c[an] review them locally as part of a domestic fraud probe d[oes] not qualify as a seizure . . . because there [i]s “no meaningful interference” with the account holder’s “possessory interest” in the data sought . . . [the retrieval] has the potential for an invasion of privacy, [but] the actual infringement of privacy occurs at the time of disclosure in the United States.”

Orin Kerr, law professor at The George Washington University School of Law, notes numerous problems with Judge Rueter’s decision. “The issue in this case is statutory, not constitutional. Even if you accept the (wrong) framing of the issue as being whether the SCA applies outside the United States, the answer has to come from what Congress focused on, not where the constitutional privacy interest may or may not be. Where you place the Fourth Amendment search or seizure strikes me as irrelevant to the extraterritorial focus of the statute.”

Kerr further contends that, “Even accepting the court’s framing, I don’t think it’s right that no seizure occurred abroad. As I see it, copying Fourth Amendment-protected files seizes them under the Fourth Amendment ‘when copying occurs without human observation and interrupts the stream of possession or transmission’. . . . That test is satisfied here when the information was copied. The court suggests that bringing a file back to the United States is not a seizure because Google moves data around all the time and ‘this interference is de minimis and temporary.’ I don’t think that works. Google is a private company not regulated by the Fourth Amendment, so whether it moves around data is irrelevant.”

It will come as no surprise that Google plans to appeal the Third Circuit decision. Likely a slough of other tech and media companies that previously filed amicus curie briefs in the Microsoft case will file briefs again, such as Apple, Amazon, AT&T, eBay, and Verizon.

Key questions that remain, then, are what will the Third Circuit decide on review?

Will the court follow the precedent set by the Second Circuit in Warrant?

Will it adopt the reasoning of the dissenters in the denial of Warrant‘s en banc review?

Will it follow Judge Rueter’s reasoning in the case at bar?

Or will it render an entirely novel opinion?

And though we can be sure that the losing party will petition the Supreme Court, one also must consider whether a final player emerge, in the form of Congress directly intervening? After all, the SCA was enacted in 1986, and many consider it not only out of date, but also relatively unworkable for modern technological issues. The time certainly seems ripe for a statutory update.

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What Can a Foul-Mouthed Twitter Troll and a Board Game Playing Robot Tell Us About Artificial Intelligence’s Ramifications for the Legal System?

AIBy Jeff Bess

Rapid technological development in the digital age has disrupted countless industries and fundamentally reshaped many aspects of modern life. Many of these technologies also present legal challenges; ranging from Constitutional privacy concerns stemming from government surveillance, to ongoing employment law disputes about companies’, like Uber, use of independent contractors. A perhaps even greater disruptor – to both the law and society in general – is found in the emerging field of Artificial Intelligence. There have been numerous scholarly inquiries into theoretical challenges of creating a moral and legal framework to govern Artificial Intelligence technologies, but recent accomplishments in the field can provide clues as to how the direction of the technology will inform necessary legal rules. Continue reading

Microsoft Moves The Cloud to the Ocean Floor

microsoftBy Carlie Bacon

Some like it hot, but datacenters don’t. When they get too toasty they crash, making waves in the sea of data storage and access.

Microsoft is making waves of a more useful variety.

 The company just launched Project Natick—a research effort that includes underwater data centers. As cloud computing becomes more prevalent, Microsoft aims to improve the ways we manipulate data. The underwater setting provides better cooling, renewable energy, and a more controlled environment than traditional land options. Continue reading